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Sigma Rule Update (2023-11-20 20:08:06) (#536)
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Co-authored-by: hach1yon <[email protected]>
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github-actions[bot] and hach1yon authored Nov 20, 2023
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Expand Up @@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ references:
- https://twitter.com/mrd0x/status/1481630810495139841?s=12
author: Tim Shelton, Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Yassine Oukessou (fix + fp)
date: 2022/01/13
modified: 2023/10/11
modified: 2023/11/14
tags:
- attack.defense_evasion
- attack.t1218.011
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -56,9 +56,6 @@ detection:
- C:\Windows\Installer\MSI
- .tmp
- zzzzInvokeManagedCustomActionOutOfProc
CommandLine|contains:
- Avira.OE.Setup
- FindOldJetBrainsProduct
condition: process_creation and (selection and not 1 of filter_*)
fields:
- NewProcessName
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@@ -0,0 +1,79 @@
title: Potentially Suspicious EventLog Recon Activity Using Log Query Utilities
id: beaa66d6-aa1b-4e3c-80f5-e0145369bfaf
related:
- id: 9cd55b6c-430a-4fa9-96f4-7cadf5229e9f
type: derived
status: experimental
description: 'Detects execution of different log query utilities to search and dump
the content of specific event logs or look for specific event IDs.
'
references:
- http://blog.talosintelligence.com/2022/09/lazarus-three-rats.html
- https://thedfirreport.com/2023/10/30/netsupport-intrusion-results-in-domain-compromise/
- https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa23-144a
- https://www.group-ib.com/blog/apt41-world-tour-2021/
- https://labs.withsecure.com/content/dam/labs/docs/f-secureLABS-tlp-white-lazarus-threat-intel-report2.pdf
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.diagnostics/get-winevent?view=powershell-7.3
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.management/get-eventlog?view=powershell-5.1
- http://www.solomonson.com/posts/2010-07-09-reading-eventviewer-command-line/
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/wevtutil
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), X__Junior (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022/09/09
modified: 2023/11/20
tags:
- attack.credential_access
- attack.discovery
- attack.t1552
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
process_creation:
EventID: 4688
Channel: Security
selection_wmi:
CommandLine|contains|all:
- Select
- Win32_NTLogEvent
selection_wevtutil_img:
- NewProcessName|endswith: \wevtutil.exe
- OriginalFileName: wevtutil.exe
selection_wevtutil_cli:
CommandLine|contains:
- ' qe '
- ' query-events '
selection_wmic_img:
- NewProcessName|endswith: \wevtutil.exe
- OriginalFileName: wevtutil.exe
selection_wmic_cli:
CommandLine|contains: ' ntevent'
selection_cmdlet:
CommandLine|contains:
- 'Get-WinEvent '
- 'get-eventlog '
selection_logs_name:
CommandLine|contains:
- Microsoft-Windows-TerminalServices-LocalSessionManager/Operational
- Microsoft-Windows-Terminal-Services-RemoteConnectionManager/Operational
- Security
selection_logs_eid:
CommandLine|contains:
- -InstanceId 4624
- System[EventID=4624]
- EventCode=?4624?
- EventIdentifier=?4624?
- -InstanceId 4778
- System[EventID=4778]
- EventCode=?4778?
- EventIdentifier=?4778?
- -InstanceId 25
- System[EventID=25]
- EventCode=?25?
- EventIdentifier=?25?
condition: process_creation and (1 of selection_logs_* and (selection_wmi or all
of selection_wevtutil_* or all of selection_wmic_* or selection_cmdlet))
falsepositives:
- Legitimate usage of the utility by administrators to query the event log
level: medium
ruletype: Sigma

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Expand Up @@ -7,9 +7,11 @@ references:
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1112/T1112.md
- https://www.mandiant.com/resources/unc2165-shifts-to-evade-sanctions
- https://blogs.vmware.com/security/2022/11/batloader-the-evasive-downloader-malware.html
author: frack113, Nasreddine Bencherchali
- https://www.malwarebytes.com/blog/detections/pum-optional-nodispbackgroundpage
- https://www.malwarebytes.com/blog/detections/pum-optional-nodispcpl
author: frack113, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), CrimpSec
date: 2022/03/18
modified: 2023/08/17
modified: 2023/11/20
tags:
- attack.defense_evasion
- attack.t1112
Expand All @@ -22,21 +24,23 @@ detection:
Channel: Security
selection_set_1:
TargetObject|endswith:
- SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer\StartMenuLogOff
- SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System\DisableChangePassword
- SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System\DisableLockWorkstation
- SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System\DisableRegistryTools
- SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\System\DisableCMD
- SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System\DisableTaskmgr
- SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System\NoDispBackgroundPage
- SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System\NoDispCPL
- SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\Explorer\DisableNotificationCenter
- SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System\DisableChangePassword
- SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System\DisableLockWorkstation
- SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer\StartMenuLogOff
- SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\System\DisableCMD
Details: DWORD (0x00000001)
selection_set_0:
TargetObject|endswith:
- SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System\shutdownwithoutlogon
- SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System\ConsentPromptBehaviorAdmin
- SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System\shutdownwithoutlogon
- SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\PushNotifications\ToastEnabled
- \SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Storage\Write Protection
- \SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\StorageDevicePolicies\WriteProtect
- SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Storage\Write Protection
- SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\StorageDevicePolicies\WriteProtect
Details: DWORD (0x00000000)
condition: registry_set and (1 of selection_set_*)
falsepositives:
Expand Down
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@@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
title: EventLog Query Requests By Builtin Utilities
id: 9cd55b6c-430a-4fa9-96f4-7cadf5229e9f
related:
- id: beaa66d6-aa1b-4e3c-80f5-e0145369bfaf
type: derived
status: experimental
description: 'Detect attempts to query the contents of the event log using command
line utilities. Attackers use this technique in order to look for sensitive information
in the logs such as passwords, usernames, IPs, etc.
'
references:
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.diagnostics/get-winevent?view=powershell-7.3
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.management/get-eventlog?view=powershell-5.1
- http://www.solomonson.com/posts/2010-07-09-reading-eventviewer-command-line/
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/wevtutil
author: Ali Alwashali, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023/11/20
tags:
- attack.t1552
- attack.credential_access
- detection.threat_hunting
logsource:
product: windows
category: process_creation
detection:
process_creation:
EventID: 4688
Channel: Security
selection_wmi:
CommandLine|contains|all:
- Select
- Win32_NTLogEvent
selection_wevtutil_img:
- NewProcessName|endswith: \wevtutil.exe
- OriginalFileName: wevtutil.exe
selection_wevtutil_cli:
CommandLine|contains:
- ' qe '
- ' query-events '
selection_wmic_img:
- NewProcessName|endswith: \wevtutil.exe
- OriginalFileName: wevtutil.exe
selection_wmic_cli:
CommandLine|contains: ' ntevent'
selection_cmdlet:
CommandLine|contains:
- 'Get-WinEvent '
- 'get-eventlog '
condition: process_creation and (selection_wmi or all of selection_wevtutil_*
or all of selection_wmic_* or selection_cmdlet)
falsepositives:
- Legitimate log access by administrators or troubleshooting tools
level: medium
ruletype: Sigma
39 changes: 39 additions & 0 deletions sigma/sysmon/dns_query/dns_query_win_devtunnels_communication.yml
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
title: DNS Query To Devtunnels Domain
id: 1cb0c6ce-3d00-44fc-ab9c-6d6d577bf20b
related:
- id: 9501f8e6-8e3d-48fc-a8a6-1089dd5d7ef4
type: similar
- id: 4b657234-038e-4ad5-997c-4be42340bce4
type: similar
- id: b3e6418f-7c7a-4fad-993a-93b65027a9f1
type: similar
status: experimental
description: 'Detects DNS query requests to Devtunnels domains. Attackers can abuse
that feature to establish a reverse shell or persistence on a machine.
'
references:
- https://blueteamops.medium.com/detecting-dev-tunnels-16f0994dc3e2
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/developer/dev-tunnels/security
- https://cydefops.com/devtunnels-unleashed
author: citron_ninja
date: 2023/10/25
modified: 2023/11/20
tags:
- attack.command_and_control
- attack.t1071.001
- sysmon
logsource:
category: dns_query
product: windows
detection:
dns_query:
EventID: 22
Channel: Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational
selection:
QueryName|endswith: .devtunnels.ms
condition: dns_query and selection
falsepositives:
- Legitimate use of Devtunnels will also trigger this.
level: medium
ruletype: Sigma
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
@@ -1,17 +1,24 @@
title: DNS Query To Devtunnels And VsCode Tunnels
title: DNS Query To Visual Studio Code Tunnels Domain
id: b3e6418f-7c7a-4fad-993a-93b65027a9f1
related:
- id: 9501f8e6-8e3d-48fc-a8a6-1089dd5d7ef4
type: similar
- id: 4b657234-038e-4ad5-997c-4be42340bce4
type: similar
- id: 1cb0c6ce-3d00-44fc-ab9c-6d6d577bf20b
type: similar
status: experimental
description: 'Detects DNS query to Devtunnels and Visual Studio Code tunnel domains.
Attackers can be abuse these features to establish a reverse shell.
description: 'Detects DNS query requests to Visual Studio Code tunnel domains. Attackers
can abuse that feature to establish a reverse shell or persistence on a machine.
'
references:
- https://ipfyx.fr/post/visual-studio-code-tunnel/
- https://badoption.eu/blog/2023/01/31/code_c2.html
- https://blueteamops.medium.com/detecting-dev-tunnels-16f0994dc3e2
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/developer/dev-tunnels/security
- https://cydefops.com/vscode-data-exfiltration
author: citron_ninja
date: 2023/10/25
modified: 2023/11/20
tags:
- attack.command_and_control
- attack.t1071.001
Expand All @@ -24,11 +31,9 @@ detection:
EventID: 22
Channel: Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational
selection:
QueryName|endswith:
- .tunnels.api.visualstudio.com
- .devtunnels.ms
QueryName|endswith: .tunnels.api.visualstudio.com
condition: dns_query and selection
falsepositives:
- Legitimate use of Visual Studio Code tunnel will also trigger this
- Legitimate use of Visual Studio Code tunnel will also trigger this.
level: medium
ruletype: Sigma
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
title: Network Connection Initiated To DevTunnels Domain
id: 9501f8e6-8e3d-48fc-a8a6-1089dd5d7ef4
related:
- id: 4b657234-038e-4ad5-997c-4be42340bce4
type: similar
- id: b3e6418f-7c7a-4fad-993a-93b65027a9f1
type: similar
- id: 1cb0c6ce-3d00-44fc-ab9c-6d6d577bf20b
type: similar
status: experimental
description: 'Detects network connections to Devtunnels domains initiated by a process
on a system. Attackers can abuse that feature to establish a reverse shell or
persistence on a machine.
'
references:
- https://blueteamops.medium.com/detecting-dev-tunnels-16f0994dc3e2
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/developer/dev-tunnels/security
- https://cydefops.com/devtunnels-unleashed
author: Kamran Saifullah
date: 2023/11/20
tags:
- attack.exfiltration
- attack.t1567.001
- sysmon
logsource:
category: network_connection
product: windows
detection:
network_connection:
EventID: 3
Channel: Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational
selection:
Initiated: 'true'
DestinationHostname|endswith: .devtunnels.ms
condition: network_connection and selection
falsepositives:
- Legitimate use of Devtunnels will also trigger this.
level: medium
ruletype: Sigma
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
title: Network Connection Initiated To Visual Studio Code Tunnels Domain
id: 4b657234-038e-4ad5-997c-4be42340bce4
related:
- id: 9501f8e6-8e3d-48fc-a8a6-1089dd5d7ef4
type: similar
- id: b3e6418f-7c7a-4fad-993a-93b65027a9f1
type: similar
- id: 1cb0c6ce-3d00-44fc-ab9c-6d6d577bf20b
type: similar
status: experimental
description: 'Detects network connections to Visual Studio Code tunnel domains initiated
by a process on a system. Attackers can abuse that feature to establish a reverse
shell or persistence on a machine.
'
references:
- https://ipfyx.fr/post/visual-studio-code-tunnel/
- https://badoption.eu/blog/2023/01/31/code_c2.html
- https://cydefops.com/vscode-data-exfiltration
author: Kamran Saifullah
date: 2023/11/20
tags:
- attack.exfiltration
- attack.t1567.001
- sysmon
logsource:
category: network_connection
product: windows
detection:
network_connection:
EventID: 3
Channel: Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational
selection:
Initiated: 'true'
DestinationHostname|endswith: .tunnels.api.visualstudio.com
condition: network_connection and selection
falsepositives:
- Legitimate use of Visual Studio Code tunnel will also trigger this.
level: medium
ruletype: Sigma
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